


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

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4 May 1973

No. 0368/73

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DOS review completed

The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents.

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Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They may be directed to the editor of the Weekly Summary,

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# Brezhnev and Detente

(NO SOURCES)

At the Central Committee meeting last week party chief Brezhnev enhanced his political position at home and his authority for conducting talks with Chancellor Brandt and President Nixon. The Central Committee provided a ringing endorsement for his detente policy. The committee elevated to Politburo membership officials who have been involved with Brezhnev's foreign policy moves and removed two of his past antagonists. Brezhnev paid for these successes, however, by the addition to the Politburo of individuals whose personal loyalty to him may, over time, be offset by the pull of the institutional interests they represent.

## Carrying the Day

Brezhnev reported to the Central Committee on foreign policy in anticipation of his trips to Bonn this month and to Washington later. The unusual participation of President Podgorny, Premier Kosygin, and ideologist Suslov in the discussion of the report highlighted its importance and provided a show of leadership unity. The plenum adopted a resolution instructing the Politburo to pursue the "peace program" in a manner that will make favorable trends in the international situation "irreversible." The resolution specifically endorsed future contacts between Soviet and foreign leaders and expanded economic relations with non-socialist countries.

The proceedings lifted Brezhnev's reputation. He was cited for his personal contribution to Soviet foreign policy, he was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize, and he was the focus of public attention on May Day to the exclusion of other leaders.

## Out in the Cold

Shelest, 65, and Voronov, 62, were "retired" from the Politburo. Both had tangled with Brezhnev on various issues and had been demoted to posts that did not warrant Politburo status. Their pairing suggests a political trade-off since they seemed to represent opposite ends of the Kremlin political spectrum.

Voronov, a moderate, lost his post as premier of the Russian Republic in 1971 after his efforts to reform agriculture in the republic caused a clash with the farm lobby in Moscow. The conservative Shelest lost his party leadership of the Ukraine last May. The immediate cause was probably his opposition to detente in general and the Moscow Summit in particular, but he also drew criticism for his nationality and economic policies.

## Old Faces to the Fore

Three full members were added to the Politburo: Defense Minister Grechko, 69, Foreign Minister Gromyko, 63, and KGB chairman Andropov, 58. Leningrad Oblast party leader Romanov, 50, attained candidate membership.

These officials have supported Brezhnev's leadership and have played important roles in the conduct of detente policies. Their promotions serve as a signal, both at home and abroad, that rapprochement with the West commands the support of the major constituencies in the USSR. The top leaders, having set out in new directions, may now see some virtue in unifying the formulation and implementation of their detente policies. Among other things, this may be designed to

IN: Gromyko, Grechko, Andropov. OUT: Voronov, Shelest



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reassure key interest groups that, although the new course has been set, their concerns will be taken into account.

Brezhnev has maintained a personal friendship with Grechko and has relied on his military authority in realizing the detente program. Grechko backed Brezhnev at the Central Committee plenum preceding President Nixon's visit. Brezhnev has worked closely with Gromyko, whose foreign policy experience is unrivaled in the Soviet Union. Andropov, previously a candidate member of the Politburo, has sought to appear as non-partisan as possible, as is required by his sensitive position.

Since Romanov assumed party leadership of Leningrad in 1970, Brezhnev has cultivated him and the local party organization. Romanov has expressed support for Brezhnev, while the latter has countenanced some of the economic organizational experiments popular in Leningrad. Among these are the industrial associations which are at the heart of the national reorganization of industrial management announced last month.

#### **Institutional Ramifications**

Brezhnev has paid a price for these gains in these new institutional arrangements. The promoted officials head organizations which, because of their sensitivity, have generally been excluded from representation on the Politburo since Stalin's death. The new full members have frequently joined Politburo deliberations as expert advisers, but now they enjoy leadership status in their own right and have a vote on policy decisions instead of only the ears of top leaders.

They head organizations that harbor considerable distrust of detente if not of Brezhnev's leadership. The longer that Grechko remains on the Politburo, the more likely his votes will come to reflect the views of his military constituents rather than his political debts to Brezhnev and other leaders. Andropov has had the job of trying to make detente abroad politically more acceptable by curbing dissidents and otherwise ensuring discipline at home. Gromyko's elevation will

strengthen his ministry's voice in foreign policy relative to that of the Central Committee apparatus, the academic institutes, and Brezhnev's own staff. These last-named laid much of the foundation of the shift to detente. In Romanov's Leningrad district, the popular attitude toward Brezhnev appears to be particularly cool, and skepticism of detente and economic reliance on the West is widespread.

The presence of these new members on the Politburo, therefore, could over time limit Brezhnev's ability to achieve policy decisions, especially on controversial matters, and tend to slow further progress on detente. At a minimum, they will reinforce bureaucratic influences on decision-making. Brezhnev has acknowledged that the principal decisions concerning detente can be made only by top political leaders who are able to cut through the bureaucratic and technical aspects of important questions.

#### **The Politburo and the Future**

The removal of political invalids from the Politburo and the addition of responsible officials should contribute to its vitality as a collective decision-maker. Grechko and Gromyko may tend to serve and report less to Brezhnev personally and more to the Politburo as a whole. The inclusion of these ministers on the Politburo also raises the possibility that the hand of the governmental apparatus will be strengthened vis-a-vis the party.

In any case, further leadership changes are in store. The Politburo, with 16 full members, is too large by normal standards. It lacks a tie-breaking vote, a situation the Soviets have tried to avoid in the past. At least two members, Shelepin and Polyansky, are politically vulnerable. The Politburo is old, and the newcomers did not lower, but raised, the median age. Indeed, the present changes did little to prepare the ground for the next generation of leadership, which must eventually begin to take shape.

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# Middle East

## THE WINDS OF WAR

3 [Cairo is attempting to impress upon the world that a resumption of hostilities with Israel is inevitable and may be at hand. In late March, President Sadat announced that Egypt was entering the "stage of all-out confrontation." Since then other Egyptian officials have sounded a war-like note. In their frustrations, the Egyptians may have decided that eventually a limited military foray against the Israelis may be necessary to break the deadlock despite the inevitability of a strong Israeli reaction.]

2 & 3 [Speaking on May Day, Sadat was softer than usual about the possibility of war, but the martial strain was audible to all. He described the present cease-fire as in Israel's interest, thus suggesting that the situation was not one Cairo would like to see continue. He warned that Cairo would move to end the present inactivity and silence, but he did not set himself any new deadlines.]

2 & 3 [Cairo continues to show interest in diplomatic efforts to resolve the problem. It may well be that Egyptian officials hope their current display of militancy will stimulate new and more vigorous peacemaking efforts.]

3 [Several factors have worked to generate Egypt's militant stance. Sadat's diplomatic offensive earlier this year served only to underscore the bleak outlook for movement on the political front. Reports of new US promises of military aid to Israel eroded Egyptian hopes that Washington would apply the pressure on Tel Aviv the Egyptians feel is necessary to break the impasse. The Israeli shootdown of a Libyan airliner on 21 February, and the Israeli raid on Beirut on 10 April made matters worse. At home, Sadat's difficulties, dominated by an almost hopeless economic situation, remain serious. Finally, Sadat is un-

doubtedly worried, as he was last year, about the implications for Egypt in the coming US-USSR summit. He has flatly told the Soviets that the US concept of a peaceful solution was an illusion.]

3 [Sadat may yet find excuses for delaying a resort to military action. The coming UN discussion of the Middle East problem offers some faint hope of a diplomatic breakthrough, and Sadat may seize on other reasons for delay as well. In view of the succession of empty Egyptian threats in the past, Sadat may have considered it necessary to put more teeth in his present campaign. Nonetheless, the Egyptian leadership may well have convinced itself that in the end only military action will generate movement toward a settlement he feels he can accept.]

## The Israeli Reaction

4 [Israel is skeptical that Sadat is engaged in anything more than another round of showmanship designed to raise Western fears of a new outbreak of fighting.]

Tel Aviv could be expected to react swiftly and strongly to any Arab military moves against it.] In any event, at sundown on 6 May ceremonies will mark Israel's first 25 years as a state. The next day a five-mile-long parade and a large aircraft flyby in and over Jerusalem will cap the festivities. Israeli security forces will be on full alert, particularly against Arab terrorist attacks. The fedayeen desire to retaliate for the Israeli raids on their facilities in Lebanon may lead them to attempt to disrupt the celebrations with violence of their own.]

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
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# Europe and A New Atlantic Charter

(15 - 18)

Western Europe may have trouble in coming up with a common response to the US suggestion that a new Atlantic charter be drafted prior to a visit by the President later this year.

The Europeans for the most part have reacted positively to Dr. Kissinger's speech on 23 April in which he called for a new look at the US-European relationship. They recognize, however, that a united Europe remains more goal than fact and believe that, even under the best of circumstances, it may be premature to expect a "European" concept of how Atlantic political, military, and economic relations should be re-ordered. As British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home remarked, "In an ideal world, we would have chosen a different time scale" for a response to Dr. Kissinger. The foreign secretary added that the EC's "political cohesion should grow apace," in order to meet the "pressure of events." EC Commissioner Soames has commented in a similar vein, saying that while external pressures may help the Europeans to "grow up politically and focus on basic issues," there are serious restraints on the ability of Europe to act as a unit at this time.

The problem is that Europe's growing sense of identity manifests itself in common policies and effective institutions on few matters other than trade. Such forums as the EC political consultations and the Eurogroup in defense matters are broadening the area of common practice. But the process is slow, and in the meantime suspicions persist among the Europeans about each

other's objectives in a dialogue between Europe and the US.

Judging by their initial reactions, most of the Nine hope to use the question of a new Atlantic charter to spark a debate on US-European relations within the EC political committee. France opposes such a debate, and Italian Foreign Minister Medici has attributed this to Pompidou's hope to act as the spokesman for Europe when he meets President Nixon next month. Paris has argued for years, however, that a trans-Atlantic dialogue risks US intervention in European decision-making processes and the dilution of Europe.

Few Europeans deny the linkage of political, military, and economic issues posed by the US. But they are concerned that the renewed US expression of commitment to Europe's defense may precede demands for European economic and trade concessions. Even the Germans, who generally see in the new American approach an opportunity to push their long-championed idea of an "institutionalized" US-EC dialogue, share Britain's reservations about overloading one set of negotiations. The Europeans remain puzzled about the roles of NATO, OECD, GATT, and the IMF in the move toward a new charter. These organizations are already exploring one or another of the issues raised in Dr. Kissinger's address. There is much uncertainty about how specific a new charter should be, and how the US proposes to bring Japan into the new Western concert.

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## VIETNAM

### THE TALKS IN PARIS

25X1 [Negotiators from Saigon and the Viet Cong continued their sterile exchanges in Paris this week, but private comments from the chief Viet Cong delegate raised the possibility of some movement before long.]

[In the plenary sessions, each side observed the end of the 90-day period since the signing of the Paris accord with a comprehensive peace proposal, and each was contemptuous of the other's plan. Privately, however, Nguyen Van Hieu, the head of the Communist team, acknowledged, "There are certain pressures on us to conduct secret talks, and we may eventually have to accede to these pressures."]

[Hieu may have been referring to pressure from Hanoi—much the same sort of pressure, perhaps, that the North Vietnamese applied to the Viet Cong when the accords were being negotiated last October. Hanoi apparently believes the Communist side could be branded obstructionist if it keeps refusing to hold any secret talks at all.]

[The North Vietnamese have put off the scheduling of a meeting between Le Duc Tho and Dr. Kissinger on the problem of cease-fire violations. In asserting that "the atmosphere is not favorable at present," North Vietnamese Vice Premier Nguyen Co Thach left open the possibility that the "atmosphere" might become favorable, perhaps after the politburo in Hanoi digests his report on the talks he held last week with Assistant Secretary Sullivan.]

### The Political Struggle in the South

25X1 [As the cease-fire period enters its fourth month, scattered violations continue on both sides, but the level of military activity is low. Most of the combat during the past week took place in the hills near Hue and in several festering sore spots in the delta. Some reports continue to reflect Communist planning for intensified action in the first three weeks of May, but most of them suggest that only small-scale operations for limited gain are envisaged.]

### Election Fever in Saigon

25X1 [Saigon political figures are beginning to focus on the Senate election scheduled for August. Half of the Senate's 60 seats will be at stake, and President Thieu apparently will make a strong effort to promote the election of members of his Democracy Party. The election is important to Thieu because opposition Senators are among the most vocal critics of his administration and have sometimes delayed important government legislation.]

25X1 [Last week the Senate amended the government bill regulating the election, adding changes that would improve opposition prospects. The government bill would have made it all but impossible for any group other than the Democracy Party to run. The revised Senate version makes it easier for the two new independent coalitions—the Freedom Party and the Social Democratic Alliance—to participate. The Lower House probably will not be able to restore the original version, but the President can propose amendments of his own. The National Assembly has seldom been able to override a final presidential version.]

25X1 [The Democracy Party will have its first real test in village council elections, scheduled to be held in all provinces except Quang Tri between now and the end of the year. Most of these contests will take place in May or June. The

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government considers the elections—the first in more than a year—as a way of demonstrating its legitimacy at the local level.

26 Since the non-Communist opposition is not widely organized at the local level, the Democracy Party should come out well in these elections. Well over 80 percent of the local contestants to announce thus far are Democracy Party candidates. Local officials are trying to head off any covert Viet Cong participation and are discouraging or disqualifying some non-Communist candidates. In scattered areas where the Democracy Party is not popular, or well established, local authorities are encouraging non-Communist opposition candidates to run so that Viet Cong sympathizers will not be elected.

#### DEALING WITH HANOI

20 The enthusiasm that non-Communist countries displayed only a few months ago for postwar aid to North Vietnam has all but evaporated. Outside of Hanoi's usual Communist suppliers, the small amount of aid offered is still mostly for humanitarian purposes.

20 The Japanese, who had seemed most eager to establish economic and political ties with Hanoi, now are more realistic about the problems. A recent Foreign Ministry mission to Hanoi agreed to no more than working-level talks on the establishment of diplomatic relations and technical talks on new telephone and telegraph links.

20 Tokyo has a sizable economic involvement in South Vietnam which it does not intend to endanger by making unnecessary political concessions to the North. Tokyo, like most European Community countries, is waiting until Hanoi and Washington have made some decisions on aid and the prospect for peace is quite solid. To date, Sweden is the only non-Communist country committed to substantial economic aid to North Vietnam—\$100 million, of which \$45 million is for a paper plant.

20 In fact, Hanoi apparently has a lot to learn about aid negotiations with non-Communist countries. The North Vietnamese have tended to present potential donors with sweeping proposals, but they often do not produce the needed back-up information, and they usually insist that the North must control all aid projects. Moreover, if the Japanese experience is any guide, the North Vietnamese reconstruction effort has been severely hampered by bureaucratic delays and inertia.

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#### CAMBODIA: OPEN FOR BUSINESS

31 After a week of backing and filling, Cambodia's new ruling body, the High Political Council, is finally in place and functioning. The last obstacle to the council's formation was removed on 28 April when Lon Nol bowed to the demands of fellow council members Sirik Matak, In Tam, and Cheng Heng and agreed that all important executive decisions be taken by majority vote. The following day, the decree establishing the council and naming Lon Nol its president and Cheng Heng its vice president was promulgated.

The council is now ready to tackle its first important task—the selection of a new prime minister and cabinet. Two of the country's three political parties have agreed to the council's request to submit candidates for ministerial positions and to appoint delegates to discuss the drafting of a program for the new government. The minuscule and fractious Democratic Party thus far has refused to respond.

Council members In Tam, Cheng Heng, and Sirik Matak are said to be pleased with the trend

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Lon Nol

31  
of events so far and are satisfied with their powers. All three remain somewhat skeptical, however, that Lon Nol will in practice share his authority, particularly in sensitive areas like the control of the military. The departure on 30 April of the President's meddlesome brother, Brigadier General Lon Non, for an extended visit to France and the US added to their guarded optimism that some political improvement is now possible.<sup>7</sup>

#### The Military Situation

31  
The favorable developments on the political scene this week were accompanied by modest successes on the battlefield. Early in the week, government troops, supported by heavy US air strikes, pushed back Khmer Communist forces from the east bank of the Mekong River opposite Phnom Penh, although light skirmishing continues. The Cambodians also reoccupied the village of Siem Reap some ten miles south of the capital and made some progress northwest of Phnom Penh in reopening Route 5. The Communists continued to hold the initiative in other areas. They still have the southern provincial capital at Takeo surrounded, and they have expanded their control over portions of the Mekong River's east bank north and south of the government base at Neak Luong.

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Cambodian Troops in Action

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## CHINA

### STROLLING IN THE PARKS

52 } The Chinese take pride in the fact that  
 8 Tienanmen Square in Peking is one of the largest  
 53 in the world. Overlooking it on the north is an  
 imposing structure that has served as a reviewing  
 stand for the country's leaders on ceremonial  
 occasions. Since the Lin Piao affair in 1971,  
 Tienanmen Square has not seen any real festivi-  
 ties, and the leaders have limited themselves to  
 small garden parties in Peking's public parks. The  
 May Day celebration this week was no exception. }

52 } Chinese officials have ascribed the scaling  
 4 down of their celebrations to economy measures,

but the more likely explanation is that Peking still  
 wants to avoid putting the leadership on the re-  
 viewing stand. This makes it easier for the Chinese  
 to conceal the political standing of their aging  
 elite and suggests that the regime still has a long  
 way to go toward resolving its many personnel  
 problems. Despite the rehabilitation last month of  
 Teng Hsiao-ping, a major target of the Cultural  
 Revolution, and some appointments in the  
 provinces, many key positions remain vacant in  
 the party, government, and military apparatus.  
 The regime also failed to publish a stock-taking  
 editorial or to issue any slogans, suggesting that  
 the leadership could not even agree on a bland  
 policy statement. }

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### US FARM PRODUCTS NEEDED

34 Agricultural imports will reach an all-time high this year following a below-average harvest last year. Peking probably will import about 6 million tons of grain, 1.7 to 2.0 million bales of cotton, 100,000 to 150,000 tons of vegetable oil, and an unknown quantity of soybeans. Over one third of the grain and cotton, most of the vegetable oil, and almost all of the soybeans will be supplied by the US.

The harvest shortfall over the past year and uncertainty about this year's prospects have forced Peking to take these measures:

- increase imports of agricultural products;
- broaden imports to include corn and lower grades of cotton;
- consider buying soybeans for third countries to meet prior commitments;
- turn to the US as a major new source of supply and a return to Australia and Latin America as secondary sources;
- cut domestic grain and cotton rations;
- cut back on the acreage sown to cotton, oilseeds, and soybeans in favor of summer-harvested grains.

44 Peking has also had to reassess its long-range agricultural development policies. A small plant program in operation since 1966 has not provided Peking with enough high-quality fertilizer to meet expanding needs. As a result, China recently purchased four large urea fertilizer plants from the West. When these plants begin to produce in the second half of the 1970s, supplies of food and clothing for the growing Chinese population will become more plentiful and will be less sensitive to the effects of poor weather.

71 Until then, Peking will have to rely on imports of agricultural products to maintain consumption, especially after poor harvests. In these circumstances, Peking obviously views the US as 37

more than an interim supplier. China no longer insists on acquiring US commodities through third country firms and recently bought small quantities of cotton and soybean oil directly from US suppliers. Peking has inquired about the availability of credit for agricultural commodities and the possibility of opening letters of credit through US banks.

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### THE KOREAS: DIPLOMATIC CONTEST

45 North Korea's application for membership in the World Health Organization will inject a contentious note into the UN agency's 25th anniversary assembly, presumably in Geneva next week. Entry into the World Health Organization would be a breakthrough for North Korea and would open the door to other UN agencies. More important, it could help Pyongyang promote a debate of the Korean issue in the UN General Assembly this fall and perhaps even help Pyongyang win an invitation to attend.

48 Seoul regards the membership application as a serious threat and is lobbying hard to have it postponed on the grounds that UN recognition of Pyongyang is a political matter and not the responsibility of an organization that is humanitarian in nature. The US, UK, Japan, and others are supporting Seoul, but the vote to postpone will be close. Pyongyang has been surprisingly successful in lining up support, and its recent admission to the Interparliamentary Union will help its case. Even if this effort fails, North Korea will have demonstrated the extent of international acceptability it now enjoys, a factor which should buttress its case in the General Assembly.

### Purge in the South

40 The South Koreans' attention has not been entirely focused on these diplomatic developments. Part of this attention has been on a political drama being played out in Seoul. Major General Yun Pil-yong, once head of the powerful

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Capital Security Command and a close personal associate of President Pak Chong-hui, has been convicted of corruption and influence peddling. Yun's real crime was the creation of a large personal following within the military and an attempt to increase his personal power. He hoped to expand the military's role in running the nation by having it supplant current civilian political organizations. There was nothing in Yun's actions

which suggested that he was prepared to make any moves without presidential approval. Still, Pak saw Yun's activities as a potential threat to presidential authority.<sup>7</sup>

37 The President decided to make an example of the general to discourage others from pursuing too far either factional or personal advantage. Yun's followers, including prominent military men, have been arrested, retired, or reassigned. Several will go to prison with him.

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Major General Yun Pil-yong

40 Reverberations from the Yun affair will be felt for some time, but will not damage the President's power or the stability of his regime. Although the military and the CIA may experience additional purges and perhaps some reorganization as a result of the scandal, Pak's action is not likely to be seen as excessive or unwarranted, particularly since Yun was a generally unpopular military figure.

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#### Philippines-Malaysia BURYING THE HATCHET?

45 Past Philippine assertions that Sabah is part of the Philippines have been an irritant in relations between Kuala Lumpur and Manila. Recently, there have been signs that Manila's position is softening. Indonesian President Suharto is trying to bring Malaysian Prime Minister Razak and President Marcos together on the issue, and the Jakarta press claims that such a summit

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meeting will occur in May. Razak and Suharto will meet in Indonesia on 5 May to discuss mutual problems. Whether Marcos plans to join them is not yet known, but a brief Razak-Marcos meeting, if Suharto can arrange it, could set the stage for a possible settlement in the near future.

45 Stripped of its hyperbole, Manila's claim to Sabah derives from flimsy historical and legal evidence that makes the Philippine Government heir to the territorial claims of the former Sultanate of Sulu. First pressed by President Macapagal in 1962, the claim to Sabah was largely used to advance the interests of Philippine politicians. In 1968 President Marcos escalated it into a matter of national honor.

45 President Marcos has not enunciated his current views on the Sabah question. Although dropping the claim would involve him in a certain loss of "face," he is genuinely interested in the possibility of containing the Muslim rebellion and is attracted by the chance of settling a contest he has no hope of winning.



45 Marcos is in a strong position to bury the Sabah claim with a minimum of fuss, if he so desires. The Philippine public is generally apathetic about Sabah and would probably approve a Marcos renunciation that emphasized statesmanship and national pride. Under martial law, Marcos does not have to worry about rival politicians or a jingoistic press exploiting nationalist sentiment against him.

45 Some military officials have argued for a hard line on Sabah in the past, but few are emotionally committed to the cause, and all would probably defer to Marcos' judgment. The military is primarily concerned about the use of Sabah as a channel of support to Muslim rebels in Mindanao. They, and Marcos, will press for a promise from Kuala Lumpur to help stop this support in return for a renunciation of the Philippine claim.

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### Philippine Sabah Claim in East Malaysia



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## FRANCE-GERMANY: SPACE LAUNCHERS

A meeting of the European Launcher Development Organization last week ratified a French - West German agreement to abandon development of the Europa II space launch vehicle that was to orbit two Franco-German Symphonie communications satellites next year. The two did reach preliminary agreement on proceeding with development of a new French space booster for the 1980s.

France had pressed the Germans to continue the Europa II program, but the latter advocated abandoning the effort in favor of a US launch vehicle. Bonn objected in particular to the cost of the project, which had risen well beyond original estimates. In addition, four efforts at launching the complete Europa II vehicle had ended in failure.

The French wanted to continue the program because of uncertainty about US willingness to launch communications satellites for other countries. Without German help, the Symphonie program will have to wait while the French and Germans attempt to reach some agreement with the US to launch one or both of the satellites.

Paris and Bonn agreed to apply the developmental work already done on the large Europa III launcher—which was killed late last year—on the French launch vehicle for the 1980s, the L3S. Bonn has agreed in principle to contribute to the French project for about eight years, although the terms of the German contribution still are being negotiated. The German share has been reported to be about 40 percent of the estimated cost of \$450 million.

Paris is prepared to finance the rest, unless it can persuade other European countries to participate, a doubtful proposition. The L3S launcher has been a top priority project for the French, and they are prepared to continue it alone even if Bonn should pull out.

The L3S is being developed by the French National Center for Space Studies. Like its predecessor—the Europa III—it is intended to launch satellites of up to 1,650 pounds into synchronous orbit. The French estimate that the L3S will

launch its first satellite in 1979. French officials have stated that France plans to use the new launch vehicle to orbit military reconnaissance and navigation satellites.


France is very likely dissatisfied with the seeming unwillingness of its European neighbors to continue programs to develop a launcher for heavy satellites. European cooperative space programs have been plagued since their inception in the early 1960s by problems of financing and a lack of commonly shared priorities.

Although France has its own independent space capabilities, a major portion of the French effort to develop large space boosters has been channeled through European organizations. Paris now may believe that its only course is to continue its own launcher programs and hope that other countries will join. France is probably as convinced as ever that its own independent space efforts compensate for Europe's disarray, especially in the launcher field.

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Europa II

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## BULGARIA: BALKAN MASQUERADE

54 } The last remnant of an independent Bulgarian foreign policy has fallen victim to Soviet interests. Bulgaria's perennial conflicts with its neighbors—mainly the Yugoslavs—have been shunted aside as Sofia tries to conform to Moscow's emphasis on European detente. The Bulgarians have swallowed their pride and even taken the initiative in trying to improve relations in the Balkans.

54 } Yugoslav demands on the Macedonian problem have been hard to swallow, but the Bulgarians have agreed to Belgrade's demand that Sofia recognize the existence of an independent Macedonian nation, language, and culture. They refused to extend this recognition to Macedonians living in Bulgaria; but under Soviet pressure, Bulgaria managed to celebrate the 95th anniversary of the Treaty of San Stefano—which established the Bulgarian state—without a word about their usual claims to Yugoslav Macedonia.

54 } The Bulgarian version of detente is evident elsewhere. Sofia has played down its differences with Greece, and signed a joint construction agreement for a Danube hydroelectric plant with Romania. An appearance of friendship with Turkey, polished during the visit of Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mladenov to Ankara last November, has continued during 1973.

54 } The Bulgarians are still every inch as nationalistic as their Balkan neighbors. Sofia's willingness to bend to accommodate Soviet interests has, at best, created only the facade of improved relations. The memories of the Balkan peoples are long, the conflicting territorial claims are many, and real friendship and trust in the Balkans are as unlikely as ever.

## THE CZECHS LOOK WEST


(5-6-61)  
Czechoslovakia is seeking this year to expand its small trade with the US at the expense of some West European partners. Imports from the US doubled last year to \$60 million, largely because of Czech purchases of soybeans and other agricultural commodities. High-protein feeds and grain will lead this year's purchase list, followed by petrochemical equipment and technology. Purchases of US products through US subsidiaries in West Germany are likely to decline, although West Germany will probably remain Czechoslovakia's major trading partner.

The Czechs are trying to enhance prospects for improved relations with the US. In April, Czech newspapers took the unusual step of giving front-page treatment to a visit of US Senators, noting that trade relations would be the main topic of discussion. Negotiation of a Czech-US consular treaty will probably be concluded this month; Prague would like to go on to discussions of most-favored-nation trade status and the gold and property claims in dispute since World War II.


Czech plans to increase imports from the US are a departure from the country's general pattern of trade with the West. Last year, the government made sure there was no increase in such imports and succeeded in reducing its hard-currency trade deficit from \$146 million to \$30 million. A planned 7-percent rise in imports this year would raise the deficit to about \$55 million, still conservative by East European standards. The Czechs could borrow in the West if they want to, but the Husak government is satisfied with present economic growth and domestic living conditions and is not likely to revert soon to large trade deficits.

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### Drought Stricken Areas in Africa



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**SECRET****AFRICA: HUNGER AND DROUGHT**

72, 73 Thousands of Africans in the non-desert areas on the southern fringe of the Sahara are suffering extreme hunger in the worst drought of the century. Many are likely to starve to death in the four to five months before the next harvest despite widespread relief efforts.]

74 Hardest hit are six French-speaking countries, Mauritania, Senegal, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, and Chad. Parts of Ghana, Togo, Dahomey, and Nigeria to the south and Sudan and Ethiopia to the east are also seriously affected. Many of these areas are suffering their fifth successive year of drought; consequently, grain reserves have long been exhausted.]

75 The drought-stricken region needs about a million tons of emergency grain imports. About 76 400,000 tons have already been committed, of which the US has pledged 152,000 tons. World- 77 wide grain shortages are limiting further interna- 78 tional response, but the distribution of grain to widely dispersed peoples in this vast and remote area is the greater problem. Some areas, such as Mali's northeast, can be supplied only by air. 79 French, West German, and Soviet aircraft are lift- ing supplies to distant tribes. Time is running out, since the onset of the rainy season in a few weeks will hamper both air and truck transport in many areas.]

80 Losses of livestock that constitute the principal wealth and prestige of the nomadic peoples inhabiting the most severely affected regions have been catastrophic. Hundreds of thousands of cattle, sheep, and goats have been slaughtered to stave off starvation. The glut has depressed meat prices, leaving herders with little cash to buy what meager supplies of grain exist. The situation will worsen. A team from the UN's Food and Agricultural Organization recently estimated that in Mali, Niger, and Upper Volta alone more than two million cattle would perish unless emergency supplies of feed arrived. This means that migratory tribesmen who do survive the next few months will have to endure many additional lean years while new herds are developed.]

81 Both short- and long-term measures for combating the effects of the drought are to be discussed by officials of aid donor countries in 82 + 83 - 84

Rome on 4 May. The US will stress a coordinated area-wide approach to the immediate situation and will propose long-term studies of the area's problems, drawing upon experience gained in semi-arid areas of the western US and soil and moisture analysis using satellite photography. [ ]

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**LEBANON: BATTLE OF BEIRUT**

70 The delicate political equilibrium in Lebanon was shaken on 2 May when heavy fighting broke out between the army and the fedayeen. Sporadic firing continued into the second day. The hostilities are the most serious since 1969 when army-fedayeen clashes left Lebanon without a government for several months.]

70A According to the Lebanese Defense Ministry, the latest fighting developed when Palestinian guerrillas, who had seized two Lebanese soldiers, fired rockets at army positions in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Lebanese forces, supported by tanks and artillery, immediately surrounded all Palestinian refugee camps in the Beirut area and fired on fedayeen strongpoints. The fighting spread to apartment buildings near the camps which were being used by guerrilla snipers to harass government forces.]

70A Army reinforcements were called into Beirut from outlying areas, and a curfew was imposed. Judging by the casualty reports, the fighting on 2 and 3 May was fairly severe. According to a preliminary report, the army lost 12 killed and 40 wounded. Fedayeen losses are unknown, but are believed to have been much higher than the 19 killed and 89 wounded admitted by the Palestinians. Estimates of civilian casualties range from 13 to 30 dead, with many more wounded.]

70 Although attempts have been made to arrange a halt in the fighting, a cease-fire that will hold may be elusive since discipline in fedayeen ranks is very poor.]

70 During clashes on 2 May, terrorists fired rockets at the US ambassador's residence and at the homes of three Lebanese political lead- ers. [ ]

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## **SOUTH ASIA: HOPES REVIVED**

Work on a settlement inched forward in April with the Indo-Bangladesh package offer to President Bhutto on the 17th. The proposal offers to release the 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war held in India (except for 195 to be tried in Dacca) simultaneously with the exchange of Bengalees in Pakistan for Biharis in Bangladesh. Bhutto's reply was restrained. Energies on both sides are being directed to narrowing the wide gap on two particularly contentious issues, war crimes trials and the transfer of the Biharis from Bangladesh to Pakistan.

Dacca's announced determination to try 195 Pakistani POWs in late May or early June could ruin any chance for an accord as far as Pakistan is concerned. President Bhutto warns that holding the trials in Bangladesh would be "the point of no return," and he has threatened to retaliate by trying some of the Bengalees in Pakistan who are waiting resettlement in Bangladesh. Prime Minister Mujib's position on the trials may be a bit more flexible than his stubborn public stance indicates, and he may agree to commuted sentences or even an exchange of convicted Pakistani prisoners for convicted Bengalees.

There may also be some give in Dacca's demand that Pakistan accept some 260,000 Biharis—now called Pakistanis by Bangladesh—who have reportedly elected to go to Pakistan. Bhutto flatly refuses to accept so many destitute Biharis, but is willing to receive some, preferably those who can prove solid family or business connections in Pakistan—possibly 10-20,000. These are essentially bargaining openers, and the actual figures seem negotiable.

Anxious to find a formula that will permit India to repatriate the Pakistani prisoners of war held since December 1971, Indian officials in Dacca are discussing variants in the package deal. While India and Bangladesh may be flexible on numbers, they consider it essential that Pakistan agree to the essentials of the package: an exchange of Bengalees and Biharis in return for repatriation of the war prisoners, except for the 195 to be tried in Dacca. New Delhi is not willing to

damage its relations with Dacca by too much arm twisting, but probably will try to soften the Bengali position. This will be a tough job, considering Dacca's reluctance last month to concede its prior insistence on Pakistani recognition as a price for India's releasing the prisoners of war. Dacca has since reaffirmed that direct talks with Pakistan must await recognition.

New Delhi reportedly will not accept Bhutto's invitation for bilateral talks in Pakistan before a revised Indo-Bangladesh position is worked out. Indian officials expect this to take several weeks. The exchange of declarations in April did inject some barely discernible movement into the long-stalemated effort to settle issues remaining from the 1971 war and faint grounds for belief that progress toward a settlement may finally be possible.

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## **PAKISTAN: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS**

The formation of governments in the two frontier provinces is a partial—and possibly only temporary—victory for President Bhutto. He will have less control over the new provincial governments than he would like, since neither of the new chief ministers belongs to his party and both the new governments will have difficulty with the provincial assemblies. The government in the North-West Frontier Province has only a slim majority; in Baluchistan, the opposition may be able to count on more votes than the government.

Last February, Bhutto dismissed the opposition governors in both provinces and the opposition government in Baluchistan. The government in the Frontier Province then resigned in protest. Since then, Bhutto's followers have been trying to put together new coalitions in both provinces. In the North-West Frontier the Bhutto forces succeeded in winning the support of a block of independents—who might well defect again if the price is right—but in Baluchistan, the opposition coalition still appears to be holding together.

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## SIERRA LEONE: NO CONTEST

94 [Parliamentary elections are due next week, and so far the electioneering has followed the pattern established during several by-elections held since President Stevens took power in 1968.

- His northern-based party has used a variety of methods, including force, to rig the outcome;

- Violence has grown steadily worse and scores of people have been killed;

- The opposition party, thoroughly outgunned, has withdrawn from further participation.]

94 [The principal tactic of Stevens' party has been simple, but effective; opposition candidates are prevented from placing their names on the ballot. At the close of nominations on 24 April, 46 ruling party candidates were declared elected unopposed, only 27 seats were contested. Nominations for 12 seats were rescheduled for 30 April, and violent confrontations were expected.]

95 [They did not occur as opposition determination to meet force with force waned in the face of government strong-arm methods.]

95 [Stevens has been under pressure from influential supporters almost since he took power to outlaw the opposition party and create a one-party state. He has resisted so far, but the opposition's withdrawal from the election produces



Siaka Stevens

something like the same effect. The withdrawal also increases the pressure from radical supporters to drop all pretext of a two-party system. Any attempt by Stevens to base a one-party system exclusively on his party would be inherently unstable. His party has its own serious divisions. More important, the opposition represents a southern ethnic group that accounts for almost one third of Sierra Leone's population; too large a group to be permanently barred from political life.

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## CHILE: THE MOOD IS UGLY

96 [In a week when President Allende received a Lenin Peace Prize, peace was particularly elusive in Chile. Supporters and opponents alike were in a surly mood on many issues, and the usual Chilean compromisers were nowhere in evidence. The bitterness generated the most widespread violence in months, as strikes and street disturbances erupted every day. In a May Day speech, Allende again accused his enemies of inciting civil war, but he has yet to give the armed forces and

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are quick to inject violence into every demonstration.]

106 [Military officers reportedly are uneasy over the growing disorders as well as over the government generally. Most still accept General Prats' position that the military cannot judge the legality of acts by a constitutionally elected president and that the solution of the present impasse should be sought by political forces using constitutional means. Nevertheless, the growing

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complaints by opposition parties that Prats and other officers provide Allende political support appear to be shared by some officers in the navy and air force and, to a lesser extent, the army.]

The government's plan to revise the educational system crystallized a surprising amount of officer discontent even after the government delayed the introduction of the scheme. Prats' strong anger against officers who criticized the plan is a measure of his concern. He warned that the military must not weaken itself by internal divisions if it is to remain capable of averting the Marxist take-over of the administration. The growing discontent has led to talk of the military's re-entering the cabinet to restore calm. Allende might in fact appreciate such military support, but there is no indication that he is prepared to buck the opposition of his own Socialist Party to such a move.]

The Christian Democrats have responded to the situation with unusual unity. There is a move afoot, supported by even leftist party leaders, to name former president Frei to head the party. Frei has been the object of particularly scurrilous attacks, and the government's intention to press the accusations raised in the ITT hearings means the attempts to discredit him will go on. The Christian Democrats are worried that their capacity to fight the government's growing power in

the economy, the press, the labor unions and the congress is being badly undermined. To show their concern, they decided not to join the official May Day celebration, a boycott joined by the Roman Catholic cardinal who has been a supporter of Allende's policies.]

Although the Christian Democrats do not share the far rightist conviction that a military coup is the only solution, they have agreed to consider a plan to impeach the entire cabinet, thus symbolically declaring the administration illegal. This sort of action is not too meaningful, and the opposition majority in congress appears likely to lose the more significant battle it is waging to curb Allende's power to expropriate. The issue is a complicated one and lends itself to propagandistic oversimplification favorable to the government, which may put it to a plebiscite.]

The shortage of foodstuffs, consumer goods, and spare parts and the prospect of politically controlled rationing contribute to the tensions. Agricultural production, already inadequate, is lagging even more because of government inefficiency, artificially depressed prices, and the activities of rural extremists. In the constant scramble to help close the gap by securing hard-to-get foreign credits, a Central Bank delegation now is traveling to Europe and the USSR.

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Chilean Rioters



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## ARGENTINA: TERRORISM AT ISSUE

110, iii, 112  
The Peronists are scheduled to take over from the military on 25 May, but the transition has come under the strongest attack so far in the wake of the assassination this week of retired Admiral Quijada, former chief of the joint general staff. President-elect Campora hurried home from his meeting with Peron in Madrid for urgent discussions with President Lanusse and the military high command. The military commanders are under pressure to take a stiff line in the talks on Campora's approach to the terrorists, on his plans regarding political amnesty, and on the military's role in internal security.

The Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army has claimed responsibility for the assassination of Quijada, who is one of several high-ranking navy officers the terrorists hold responsible for the death of 16 prisoners last year. Of the six admirals on the panel that investigated the affair, two have now been assassinated and a third was kidnaped and is still being held by the Trotskyites. Revenge is undoubtedly part of their motive, but they also hope to provoke the military into blocking the Peronists' accession to power in the belief that the resulting turmoil would aid the revolutionary cause.

Even before the admiral was killed, a resurgence of a hard anti-Peronist position in the armed forces had been stimulated by the stated plans of Peronist youth leaders to form armed youth militias. The idea alarmed moderate Peronists as well as the military, and Peron him-



**Terrorist Slogan**

*"Popular Justice for the Enemies of the People"*

self acted quickly to eliminate the source of trouble. Rodolfo Galimberti was dismissed from his official posts in the Peronist movement, and Juan Abal Medina, the 29-year-old Peronist secretary-general, was reprimanded for overstepping his authority.

Peron's willingness to deal quickly and severely with these two, despite the risk of losing the support of more radical youth, suggests that he may also be more accommodating to the military in order to assure that the Peronists take power as scheduled and are not under a cloud from the start. The fact that Campora returned from Madrid when Lanusse beckoned and is meeting with the armed forces leaders is in itself a reversal of Campora's earlier position of avoiding contact with Lanusse and other senior generals.

A majority of senior officers still hopes to avoid a head-on clash. Campora will come under increasing pressure from the armed forces, however, and if additional officers are attacked by terrorists, only full cooperation with the military will enable Campora to make it through the three weeks remaining before his inauguration.

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### PANAMA: CANAL TALKS

112 [Negotiations on a new canal treaty between the US and Panama, stalled since February, may resume soon. Panama is about to reply to the latest US offer. The reply, promised last week by Foreign Minister Tack but delayed by drafting difficulties, is not likely to offer anything new.]

113 [Foreign Minister Tack has expressed doubts that the negotiations, which have been going on for nine years, will get anywhere since the two countries cannot agree on the basic principles involved.] [Recent Panamanian contributions to negotiations have been limited to detailed criticisms of US positions without any counter-offers.]

114 [The coming Panamanian statement is not likely to change this pattern. Tack recently told the US ambassador that he plans to send a message soon to try to clarify his government's position on such points as the duration of a future treaty, jurisdiction over the Canal Zone, and canal defense.] [He may also request that the US negotiating team return to Panama, if only to give the impression that talks are moving along.]

115 [The Torrijos government has made some effort to improve the atmosphere for negotiations by turning off the anti-US propaganda that has been coming out of Panama, in varying intensity, since last year. The government-controlled press has cut back comment on the canal issue; Torrijos was absent from the speaker's stand at May Day ceremonies and thus avoided saying anything about US-Panamanian relations.]

116 [Tack's pessimism about negotiations on the ambassadorial level reflects the views of most Panamanian leaders and certainly of Torrijos, who has long been suspicious of diplomacy and convinced that a high-level meeting was needed to break the stalemate. Torrijos is aware that the Security Council meeting in March cooled his relations with the US and damaged his chances for face-to-face talks at higher levels. He must

now decide whether to wait for time to heal his relations with Washington or launch a new effort to move the US toward a position that he can accept. [REDACTED]

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### BOLIVIA: NEW FACES, OLD PROBLEMS

(117 - 121)  
The new cabinet ministers appointed last week are more loyal to President Banzer and less politically ambitious than their predecessors. On the other hand, they are probably less competent to deal with the persistent economic problems that still bedevil the country.

Despite the cabinet shifts, the two main political parties in the coalition go on jockeying for position; neither is keeping secret its desire to oust the other from the government. In order to appear more broadly based and to improve its image with the military, the right-wing Bolivian Socialist Falange has formed an alliance with four small parties made up of minor politicians who once rode the coattails of the late President Barrientos. The other, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, has begun discussions with the Christian Democrats and with one of the groups which split off from the Movement years ago. The ties that propelled the Falange and the Movement into the Banzer government two years ago have loosened considerably. Each now believes itself to be strong enough to do without the other—provided it receives the blessing of the military.

The leaders of the two parties strengthened their hands in the cabinet shuffle when their chief rivals were removed from office; in addition, 20 other politicians were shipped to exile in Paraguay. The exiles, from right- and left-wing parties outside the government, will probably swell the ranks of exiles said to be congregating in Buenos Aires.]

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The frustrations of dealing with complex problems, few of which can be resolved by government action alone, fuel political unrest in Bolivia, and a cabinet shuffle will not reduce prices or ease political tensions for long. It has, perhaps, given President Banzer a little time to grapple again with his problems, but his future is less bright than before. External threats to his government cannot be taken seriously, but continued drift may encourage one of the government's component parts to try to force more far-reaching changes in the coalition. The military, which holds the trump cards, still supports the President. [REDACTED]

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#### CUBA: MAY DAY SPEECH

122 + 123

Fidel Castro's May Day speech gave no hint of a softening in his attitude toward the US. Rather, he addressed himself to pushing Cuba to the forefront of a Latin America united against the US. Castro championed—as Cuban spokesmen have repeatedly done in recent international forums—all of the major complaints the Latin Americans have raised against US economic policies in the hemisphere.

The Cuban leader had little to say on the subject of armed struggle, making one brief refer-

ence to Cuba's sympathy and support for revolutionaries fighting against reactionary governments. He reaffirmed that Cuba wants nothing to do with the OAS as long as the US is a member and the headquarters is in Washington, but he apparently recognizes that he lacks the influence with other Latin Americans to change the OAS.

On relations with the US, Castro stated that the initiation of a dialogue with Washington would have to be preceded by the unconditional termination of the economic blockade. His statements on the Guantanamo naval base implied that its return is not a precondition for talks, though that stipulation has been made by other high-level Cuban spokesmen. Castro did say that relations could not improve as long as the US holds the base.

Castro rejected any secret, direct negotiations with Washington, saying "We are not interested in receiving any US representative." Castro, it would seem, sees no possibility of rapprochement with the US in the near future.

Castro's frigid tone on the subject of US-Cuban relations may be related to a growing concern over the implications for Cuba of the expected Brezhnev trip to Washington. Fidel may press the Soviet leader, who has never been to Cuba, to stop off in Havana either before or after his trip to the US. If Brezhnev agrees to stop in Havana, Castro will undoubtedly press for reassurances on Cuban interests. [REDACTED]

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